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To improve system performances and process dependability, analyzing the system accurately is
an essential step but difficult to achieve and it is even more challenging if the system is complex and
dynamic. A popular tool called FMEA has been widely used to analyze and improve systems. However,
both academia and industry acknowledge its subjectivity and lack of cause-effect analysis capability.
Therefore, in this research, the author presents a more objective and data-driven method called Discrete
Event Simulation to improve FMEA’s analysis capability. Also, a step-by-step analysis approach is
presented by a case study to showcase how the Discrete Event Simulation may enhance FMEA. The case
study illustrates that Discrete Event Simulation can quantify FMEA’s rating process for Severity,
Occurrence, and Detection of a failure mode so it could conduct a more reliable evaluation on system
performance.
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION

Continuous improvement of products and processes plays a significant role for companies to have
competitive advantages in highly challenging markets such as manufacturing, service sector, and
healthcare (Doshi & Desai, 2017). Hence, organizations need effective approaches to achieve sustainable
and ongoing performance improvement effort to achieve such a goal. One such methodology, Lean Six
Sigma, is a comprehensive practice to eliminate the defects and wastes in a system with various
improvement tools to address the system related issues.
Among these tools, FMEA (Failure Modes & Effect Analysis) is widely adopted by industries,
which is a systematic method designed for dependability analysis (Scipioni et al., 2002). It is used to
recognize possible failures and their impacts on processes and products (Doshi & Desai, 2017). FMEA
was introduced for the first time in 1949 by the US army. During the 1970s, due to its powerful and valid
features, its implementation also spreaded into aerospace, automotive, and general manufacturing
(Scipioni et al., 2002).
FMEA is a team activity that involves, first, studying and evaluating the processes or products
(Scipioni et al., 2002); then, listing the possible failures and their effects; and, lastly, establishing future
actions that could eliminate or reduce potential failures (Hekmatpanah et al., 2011). To determine the
level of potential risks related to the failure of a certain element of the process, the risk priority number
(RPN) is calculated by multiplying its occurrence, severity, and detection of a failure. Each element is
ranked based on a 1 to 10 scale using its RPN value, and higher the RPN is, the more urgency of the
future actions is required (Hekmatpanah et al., 2011).
FMEA is an effective tool to improve processes by proactively identifying and preventing high
risk elements in the system. The case study done by Hekmatpanah et al. (2011) shows that after
implementing FMEA, the net profit of the organization in the study increased significantly. Another study
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indicates that when FMEA is integrated with HACCP (Hazard Analysis Critical Control Points) system in
a food company, it greatly improved the process reliability of the system in the company (Scipioni et al.,
2002).
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CHAPTER II: LITERATURE REVIEW

FMEA is a well-known Six Sigma tool that has been widely applied by various industries.
However, FMEA’s deficiencies are also acknowledged by both academia and industry (Spreafico et al.,
2017). Therefore, many researches have been done to improve FMEA’s analysis capability so it can be
more efficient and accurate.
For instance, Sutrisno et al. (2016) realized that FMEA over relies on RPN and ignore the
business environment that an organization is within. This may result in inaccurate measurement of
economic, managemental, operational impact of a failure mode. Therefore, Sutrisno et al. (2016)
introduced integrating SWOT (strength, weakness, opportunity and threat analysis) analysis into FMEA in
order to select most suitable future actions by analyzing internal and external factors that the
organizations face. After listing the failure modes using FMEA, they first recognized the SWOT
variables. They were the strength and weakness variables that an organization has internally, and
opportunity and threat variable could be faced by implementing a specific future action. After this, future
actions’ preference scores and benefit indexes were calculated using SWOT formula. The third main step
was to combine BCOR2 approach with SWOT analysis to get the final preferred action. BCOR2
represents a specific action’s benefit, implementation cost, weight of impact, and organizational resilience
to that action. The higher the final preferred score, the more suitable the action is for the organization. In
addition, the research used a case study of a gas producing company to illustrate SWOT analysis’s
efficiency and usefulness. After integrating SWOT analysis into FMEA analysis, not the action with
higher RPN but the more suitable future actions were chosen to be implemented after thorough evaluation
of business environment. SWOT analysis covered the elements that FMEA does not, such as, benefit,
cost, opportunity, risk, organizational readiness. This may result in helping decision makers make better
decision without overlooking the impact of the business environment. Hence, SWOT analysis approach

3

could be an effective tool to improve FMEA’s future action selection (Sutrisno et al., 2016). However,
one factor in the research should be pointed out that even though SWOT analysis is an effective tool,
there were some subjective knowledge involved in rating process in SWOT approach. For example, the
process of calculating an action’s benefit needs rating the impact of that action based on what the FMEA
cross-functional team thinks. This may affect the whole result (Sutrisno et al., 2016).
Another research introduced combination of FTA and FMEA to improve failure analysis. Peeters
et al. (2018) mentioned the FMEA’s disadvantages as well. First, FMEA could be very time consuming if
it is applied thoroughly. Secondly, FMEA is challenging when it is applied for a new and complex
system, because FMEA requires team members to have knowledge and experience on the system. Third,
through FMEA, it is difficult to achieve enough depth of analysis to fully understand the relationship
between the system and failure behaviors. Therefore, they suggested that combination of FTA and FMEA
might help improve the overall performance of failure analysis. FTA represents Fault Tree Analysis. It is
an approach that analyzes the system from top to down. That means, unlike FMEA, FTA is a structured
approach that considers system level, function level, and component level in a system. FTA is a logic
diagram uses logic gates, such as, “OR”, “AND”, and inhibit or conditional gates to represent the
relationships between system failures and cause of failures. With that, the method the authors

used

was to apply FTA, first, to identify possible failures level by level described above. Then, they applied
FMEA to analyze the criticality of the failures in each level. In other word, based on RPN, critical failures
and, in the end, future actions were decided. The contributions of this type approach were, first, it
provided more detailed failure analysis since different levels of the system were analyzed thoroughly.
Secondly, this approach provided efficiency for analyzing a system. Because FTA analyzes the system
from top to down, in a structured manner and this can offer better understanding of a system. They also
conducted a case study in an additive manufacturing company for metal printing to present the idea. The
company was satisfied with the result. They could use the result to understand their additive
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manufacturing system profoundly and redesign it. Also, they could design an effective maintenance
program to reduce some critical failures’ risks. All things considered, combination of FTA and FMEA
was an effective way to improve efficiency of failure analysis. However, the authors also mentioned that
there were some downsides of this type approach as well. For example, this approach may have limited
efficiency if it is applied to a more complex system that has multiple sub-systems. In other word,
combination of FTA and FMEA can provide more structured analysis on relatively less complex systems
(Peeters et al., 2018).
Chang, and Sun (2009) introduced applying DEA to enhance assessment capacity of FMEA.
They discuss that the fundamental problem of FMEA is that it solely relies on RPN to quantify the risk of
failures without properly taking factors that contribute to risk into consideration. This may result in
inaccurate decision in terms of tackling with failures. DEA, as a linear programing-based methodology,
tests inputs and outputs to offer efficiency scores among DMUs. DMU stands for Decision Making Unit.
Efficiency score of a DMU is the ratio of the sum of weighted inputs and the sum of weighted outputs.
DMU is equivalent to failure mode in FMEA. SODs in FMEA are equivalent to multiple inputs in DEA.
With that, the higher the efficiency score the higher priority a failure mode has. Chang and Sun (2009)
used Dillibabu and Krishnaiah’s (2006) study to illustrate the DEA’s efficiency. Dillibabu and Krishnaiah
(2006) applied FMEA to improve defect-free software in their study. After applying DEA to the same
failure modes, they figured the new result was different. The priorities of those failure modes were
different than previous study. That means, DEA could provide different perspective for decision makers.
Because simply relying on RPN does not tell them the whole story. Therefore, DEA, as a quantitative
tool, can be helpful for management to allocate their resources more efficiently (Chang & Sun, 2009).
Nevertheless, DEA has its disadvantages as well. First, DEA’s results are sensitive to the selection of
inputs (Berg, 2010, p. 44-45). DEA uses SODs from FMEA to calculate inputs. Usually, SODs are rated
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subjectively based on knowledge and experience. This may affect DEA’s result. Secondly, it could be
difficult to understand for people who do not have a mathematic background.
Shaker et al. (2019) approach was integrating two-phase quality function deployment (QFD) into
FMEA for improving the latter one. After reviewing abundant literatures regarding improving the FMEA,
they discussed that FMEA’s over-reliance on RPN can cause negligence on interrelationship among
various factors such as, failure modes, failure effects, and failure causes. So, they tried to apply QFD- a
customer-driven method to understand customers’ needs- in an integrative way to improve FMEA. In the
first phase, there were two types of outputs. They were prioritized failure effects and prioritized failure
modes. The importance rates of the failure effects could be considered as Severity and they were gained
by conventional FMEA. Then interrelationship weights between these failure modes and failure effects
were rated based on 1: weak; 3: moderate; and 9: strong. After this, the importance rates of the failure
modes were multiplied by the interrelationship weights. Finally, the total weight of each failure mode was
sum up and entered to the second phase as a new importance rate.
In the second phase, there were also two outputs. They were prioritized failure causes and prioritized
failure modes. Other computations were same as in the first phase. The authors used a steelmanufacturing
company as a case study to showcase their approach’s effectiveness. The contribution of this approach
was that it considered the interrelationship between failure modes, failure effects, and failure causes.
More importantly, this approach could provide more efficiency for manufacturing departments and
maintenance departments in organizations that have continuous production lines (Shaker et al., 2019).
However, in this approach, the importance rates were obtained by conventional FMEA on a 1-10 scale. It
is difficult to accurately quantify the importance rate. Hence, if importance rate reduces or increases, even
by 1, due to different perspectives from FMEA team, the result could be affected. Also, same problem can
apply to interrelationship weights.
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Liu et al. (2015) proposed a hybrid FMEA integrated with VIKOR method, decision making trial
and evaluation laboratory (DEMATEL), and analytic hierarchy process (AHP). Regarding FMEA, they
mentioned that over-reliance on RPN and the way it is calculated is a disadvantage that many researchers
agree with. By contrast, the new approach they suggested considers interrelation between failure modes
and failure effects and provides more thorough cause-effect analysis. Therefore, their proposed approach
could complete FMEA’s downside. The authors new hybrid approach has three phases. They first applied
FMEA to identify the failure modes and calculated their RPNs. Then they apply VIKOR method to
determine the effects of failure modes. In the second phase, DEMATEL was used to create an influential
relation map among failure modes and causes. In the final step, based on DEMATEL’s result, AHP was
applied to obtain final influential weights and failure modes were prioritized. They also conducted a case
study using diesel engine’s turbocharger system. After applying the new approach, final rankings of the
failure modes were different than the result obtained by conventional FMEA. That means, the authors’
approach could provide a more accurate and comprehensive analysis in terms of considering
interrelationships between failure modes and failure effects. However, they also mentioned three
downsides of the approach. One of them was that conventional FMEA provided the quantification of
failure modes’ factors such as Severity, Occurrence, and Detection. But in reality, it is difficult to quantify
failure modes’ factors due to complexity of a system (Liu et al., 2015).
Spreafico et al. (2017) conducted a wide and very thorough state-of-the-art review of FMEA and
its improvement from 1978 to 2016. They collected documents from both academia and industry and
classified the documents based on authors, source, and four technical classes. The technical classes were
applicability, cause and effect, risk analysis, and problem solving of the FMEA. Spreafico et al. (2017)
mentioned that the difference of the review was that it extended the analysis to patent fields. Also, they
applied Espacenet worldwide service for the patent research, which is considered the most proliferated
and complete collection of patent documents. Most critically, they manually classified the documents in
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order to exclude documents describing only applications without suggesting any methodological
enhancement and documents with too few quotes compared to the years of publication. With that, they
reviewed 220 scientific papers and 109 patents. After reviewing all the selected documents, their findings
about FMEA was that, in applicability, subjectivity and time consuming was the biggest problem for both
academia and industry; in cause and effect, lack of secondary effects modelling for academia and
difficulty to decide the right level of detail for industry was the main problem; in risk analysis, high
subjectivity during the risk evaluation was main problem and the critic mainly came from academia; in
problem solving, to both academia and industry, lack of well-defined problems with specific goals and
lack of clearly-defined, clearly expected solution was the main problem.
As mentioned, they also reviewed the improvement attempted by both academia and industry.
Their finding was that many different methods such as, Fuzzy logic, Functional Analysis, TRIZ,
Historical data DB, QFD, FTA, and many other methods, have been used to improve FMEA’s four
technical classes. They discussed such approaches could offer incremental solution for the specific
problems. However, they also mentioned some remaining problems FMEA. First, there were no effective
solutions for time consuming and boredom of the FMEA. Second, there were no solutions were found to
radically change the operation sequence of FMEA or solution for better ranking intervention (Spreafico et
al., 2017).
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CHAPTER III: PROBLEM STATEMENT

Despite numerous researches have been done to improve FMEA, researchers identify some of its
fundamental problems, such as subjective analysis and lack of cause-effect analysis capability, are still
open to be enhanced (Spreafico et al., 2017; Chang & Sun, 2009). With that, although FMEA has its
quantitative part like RPN, the approach to obtain these numbers are still subjective and qualitative.
Practitioners from different domains use heavily their knowledge and past experience in a subjective
manner when quantifying the level of risks (Scipioni et al., 2002). Therefore, the RPN can fluctuate quite
a bit depending on whose opinions are valued more. This makes the outcomes of the FMEA analysis not
reliable and inconsistent because of its methodological bias (Hekmatpanah et al., 2011). Furthermore,
FMEA has a limited cause-effect analysis capability because it lacks depth and objectivity in its analysis.
This weakness becomes more obvious when FMEA is applied to a new or complex system (Peeters et al.,
2018; Shaker et al., 2019; Seyed-Hosseini et al., 2006). Hence, FMEA may not be able to provide
valuable information for decision-makers. As a result, subjective analysis and lack of cause-effect
analysis capability may make FMEA a practice with less confidence and accuracy, driven more by
qualitative analysis even though it has to be objective and quantitative (Murphy et al., 2011).
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CHAPTER IV: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

To enhance FMEA’s subjectivity and lack of cause-effect analysis capability, in this research, a
simulation technique called discrete event simulation (DES) will be introduced as a potential technique to
complement FMEA. Discrete event simulation is a computer simulation method that models various
reallife systems. The simulated systems may consist of one or multiple events that occur independently in
a discrete time manner. The discrete event simulation is chosen because, unlike FMEA, it relies on
evidentiary data to analyze the system behavior and cause-effect of failures with clear solutions. Hence, it
has a strong, objective foundation to evaluate each failure’s severity, occurrence, detection, and ultimately
their RPNs (Jacobson et al., 2006; Parks et al., 2011; Misra, 1986; Raunak et al., 2009; Wohlgemuth et
al., 2006; Sumari et al., 2013) which are the elements FMEA’s weaknesses are embodied in.
To explain the proposed method, a case study regarding a relatively complex system is conducted
by the author in later session. There are two phases in the study. In phase A, conventional FMEA is
conducted independently on the system and its weaknesses are discussed. In phase B, integrated method is
used. The failure modes obtained from FMEA are utilized first. But discrete event simulation is applied to
analyze the system behavior and cause-effect of each failure mode. There will be three steps of analysis in
this phase. Each step uses different KPI(s) and two scenarios to analyze the failure mode from different
perspectives. More importantly, to showcase how discrete event simulation can enhance FMEA by its
quantitative approach, each failure mode’s RPN is reevaluated based on the outcome of the simulation
and compared with FMEA’s result. RPN score will be dynamic from one analysis to another. This may
result in different insight for cause-effect of the failure mode because the system is analyzed in more
depth and in different environments. With that, discrete event simulation’s result may offer new ways of
conducting FMEA more efficiently.
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CHAPTER V: CASE STUDY

In this research, as a way of demonstrating how the dependability analysis capability of FMEA
can be enhanced, the discrete event simulation is introduced and directly compared against FMEA. To
better illustrate the FMEA can be enhanced by discrete event simulation, a case involving a distribution
center (DC) will be used. A visual snapshot of the DC used is shown in Figure 1. The DC simulation
model is an existing example model from AnyLogic team. The FMEA regarding DC was conducted by
the author independently.
Figure 1. An operational scene of the distribution center used in the case

Warehouse Operation
In this case study, the operation in 24 hours shift distribution center involves three main
processes. They are unloading, assembly, and loading. First, in the unloading process, unloading trucks
deliver pallets to an available unloading dock. Then, pallets are unloaded from the trucks using forklifts
and placed in the receiving dock area. After this, pallets are transported to the main storage racks. Second,
in the assembly process, orders from distribution center’s clients are assembled from the pallets. An order
can be of same or different types of pallets and are assembled by forklifts. In this process, enough space

11

for the assembly area near the loading docks is needed (or a backup storage area can be used in case there
is not enough space there), and main storage must have the required number of pallets for them to be
assembled. Third, in the loading process, once the orders are assembled, a loading truck is assigned to the
loading dock to receive the order. Then forklifts will load the orders into the truck from assembly area.
The order quantity for a truck must take up at least half of its capacity.
The simulation model has the layout of the distribution center to display the progress of the
operation. The layout is presented in Figure 2 where the main storage area, standby storage, loading and
unloading docks are presented. These elements help analyzing the processes while the simulation is
running.
Figure 2: Layout of the center
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Simulation Description
The simulation has its underlying logic in order to represent the processes in the distribution
center. Figure 3 shows the logic of the simulation where the unloading and loading processes represented
using the simulation blocks such as queues and delays. The assembly process is embedded into loading
process. Also, the “initial filling of the storage” represents placing the pallets in the main storage area.
The other two processes, such as “moving from the storage to a moving dock”, and “moving from a
standby storage to a moving dock” represent placing the assembled pallets in the loading dock area. Every
block in the logic represents an event. For example, the block “truckUnloading” is the event of forklifts
unloading the pallets from trucks. The pallets as the main target of the production at the distribution center
go through multiple events which all together represent the entire operation process. Also, the input data
used in the logic are represented by different parameters shown in figure 4. Some important parameters
are:
•

Unloading rate (7)- approximately 7 unloading trucks arrive at the center per hour.

•

Loading rate (3)- approximately 3 loading trucks arrive at the center per hour.

•

Order rate (3)- approximately 3 orders are placed per hour. Each order quantity is between 10
and 14.

•

Number of unloading docks (5)- There are 5 unloading docks.

•

Number of loading docks (6)- There are 6 loading docks.

•

Number of forklifts (20)- There are 20 forklifts in the center (May change based on different
scenarios).
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Figure 3: Details of the simulation logic of the distribution center

Figure 4: Parameters in the simulation

There are two parts of dependability analysis conducted in the case study. In Part A, FMEA is
applied first to analyze the processes to evaluate possible failures in the system, the causes of the failures,
effects, RPN, and future actions. After this is finished, its limitations are discussed. In Part B, as
comparison, the discrete event simulation method is applied to explore the same processes in three
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different levels. In this part, the simulation outcome is utilized to showcase how the discrete event
simulation can enhance FMEA’s capability.

FMEA On Distribution Center: Phase A
In this part, a detailed FMEA analysis of the distribution center is described. As a first step, the
processes should be studied carefully in order to distinguish the possible failures. There are three main
phases to focus on for the evaluation of various potential failures. As shown in Table 1, the processes of
the distribution center are divided into 1) the unloading phase; 2) the assembling phase; and 3) the loading
phase. And each phase relies on a few critical operational resources such as trucks, forklifts, and pallets
for the processes to operate as intended.
Table 1: Main Phases and Related Critical Resources, and Process Details
Main
Phases
Critical
Resources

Unloading trucks
Loading trucks
Forklifts
Pallets
Pallet Racks

Phase 1

Phase 2

Phase 3

Unloading

Assembling

Loading

The distribution center
receives pallets
delivered by trucks.
Pallets are then
unloaded from the
trucks using forklifts
and placed in the
receiving dock area.
After this, other
forklifts move the
pallets to the main
storage area.

Orders from distribution
center’s clients are
assembled from same or
different types of pallets
by forklifts accordingly
and placed in the
loading area.

After the orders are
assembled, a truck is
assigned to the loading
dock. Then forklifts
will load the pallets into
the truck.

After the preliminary understanding of the processes in the distribution center, the second step is
to evaluate possible failures, the causes of the failures, their effects, and the current controls, and calculate
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the risk priority number (RPN) related to the critical resources over different phases. As the last step, the
action priorities are determined based on the RPN values and suggested future actions are provided to
prevent the identified failures from happening, hence the processes could be enhanced over time.
RPN is calculated based on the ratings of severity, occurrence, and detection. RPN is the product
of these elements. The rating approach in this research is shown in table 2, 3, and 4.
Table 2: Ratings for The Severity of a Failure (Andrejić and Kilibarda, 2017)
Rating Effect
Severity of effect
Hazardous without Very high severity ranking when a potential failure mode effects safe or
10
warning
effective system operation
Hazardous with
Very high severity ranking when a potential failure mode affects safe or
9
warning
effective system operation
System operates ineffectively with destructive failure without
8
Very high
compromising safety
7
High
System operates without efficiency
6
Moderate
System operates with minor damage and deficiency
5
Low
System operates with minor deficiency
4
Very low
System operates with significant degradation of performance
3
2
1

Minor
Very minor
None

System operates with some degradation of performance
System operates with minimal interference
No effect

Rating
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1

Table 3: Ratings for The Occurrence of a Failure (Andrejić and Kilibarda, 2017)
Probability of occurrence
Failure probability
Very high: failure is almost inevitable >1 in 2
1 in 3
High: repeated failures
1 in 8
1 in 20
Moderate: occasional failures
1 in 80
1 in 400
1 in 2000
Low: relatively few failures
1 in 15,000
1 in 150,000
Remote: failure is unlikely
<1 in 1,500,000
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Rating
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1

Table 4: Ratings for The Detection (Andrejić and Kilibarda, 2017)
Detection
Likelihood of detection by current control
Absolute uncertainty Current control cannot detect potential cause
Very remote
Very remote chance the current control will detect potential cause
Remote
Remote chance the current control will detect potential cause
Very low
Very low chance the current control will detect potential cause
Low
Low chance the current control will detect potential cause
Moderate
Moderate chance the current control will detect potential cause
Moderately high
Moderately high chance the current control will detect potential cause
High
High chance the current control will detect potential cause
Very high
Very high chance the current control will detect potential cause
Almost certain
Current control will detect potential cause

Table 5 shows a section of the complete FMEA analysis related to the failures to do with the
forklift resource (The entire FMEA analysis is included in the Appendix). Under the “Forklifts” category,
there are several sub-categories of what could go wrong and its more specific failure items are identified.
For example, as highlighted with the red line, under the “Amount of Forklifts”, “Less than needed” is
identified as one of its possible failures. The assumption in this analysis is that there are 20 forklifts in the
center, and they are not enough to operate center efficiently. With that, for this possible failure,
“Insufficient understanding of daily need for forklifts” is listed as a cause of the failure. Then, “A: May
cause longer operation time. Hence, may delay the orders”, “B: May cause stress for employees”, and “C:
May Shorten forklifts’ lifetime” are assessed as the effects of the failure. After establishing these, RPN is
calculated to be 96 based on the level of perception of the occurrence, severity, and detection of the
effects of the failure. The RPN value (240) is higher with respect to other failure items, which justifies the
Action Priority as “Urgent”. As a result, a Suggested Action, “Try to understand the need for forklifts
based on the order flow and adjust the amount”, is recommended to prevent the perceived failure. This
analysis is called “Analysis A” in order to be compared with further analysis using discrete event
simulation in later sessions.
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Table 5: Example of Analysis A

FMEA’s inherent deficiencies can be seen from Analysis A. First, Analysis A is a subjective
analysis. This may be the vital disadvantage of FMEA. During the FMEA approach, one of the main
challenges is that it relies on tacit knowledge and opinions heavily. This may result in different or
inconsistent outcomes from the FMEA analysis. This could be significant because when calculating the
RPN, the subjective opinions and inputs heavily influences how the severity, occurrence, and detection
are determined. One may have totally different views on all these elements than others. One may assess
the severity of the less forklifts to be 6 and others may consider it to be 9, which could produce a large
deviation in the RPN value, which results in quite different action priority and therefore the suggested
actions are taken more seriously or less seriously. Since organizations rank their future actions based on
action priorities, this type of subjective analysis of FMEA may lead to possible economic loss and
magnify the problems in the system even bigger.
Second, FMEA is not able to create comparison analysis to Analysis A. If we assume there are 30
forklifts in the system now and see what difference it could make using FMEA, it is not possible to
conduct an “what if” scenario analysis. This is because when Analysis A is conducted, there is not any
quantitative or scenario to support it. This results in evaluating the impact of the failure mode without any
foundation. Without foundation, it is not possible to conduct comparison analysis. Its inability to create
quantitative comparison analysis makes it difficult to understand the system behavior in depth. Therefore,
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it may be difficult to make proper decisions to optimize the overall system performance for the long-term
by using FMEA. The example is given in table 6.
Table 6: FMEA Based Comparison Analysis (FMEA’s Inability to Conduct “What If” Scenarios)
Original FMEA analysis
Analysis A (20 forklifts):
• Severity: 8
• Occurrence: 5
• Detection: 6
• RPN: 240
Comparison FMEA analysis
Analysis A` (30 forklifts):
• Severity: ?
• Occurrence: ?
• Detection: ?
• RPN: ?

Third, FMEA could possibly miss possible failures all together. This may happen because, during
the FMEA, entire operation process is not visualized, and hidden effects cannot be identified as well.
There may be possibilities for the FMEA participant to overlook some small but important aspects of the
process in the evaluation, especially if it is a new and complex system. In addition to that, if any subtle
changes happen in the processes, the effects of these changes are hard to detect since there is no direct
way to measure the impact of the changes in FMEA. This may also result in another possible failures not
considered in the analysis.
In summary, FMEA is a strong operation improvement tool to enhance the system performance
by eliminating the potential reasons of the system failure, it is based on the subjective assessment of the
failures and is not able to create comparison analysis. On the other hand, in reality these failures are not
isolated cases but rather they are often entangled with each other. One failure, small or large, may have
come from another one issue, and may produce subsequent failures down the line of the processes.
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Discrete Event Simulation on Distribution Center: Phase B

To improve FMEA’s deficiencies discussed in the earlier sessions, discrete event simulation is
conducted on distribution center using the same failure mode- “Amount of Forklift”- analyzed by FMEA.
The statistical outcome from the simulation is applied to analyze the system behavior. Furthermore, there
are three levels of analysis in this session. They are compared with Analysis A from FMEA and with
other analysis later on. In addition, there are three KPIs used to analyze the impact of the failure. They are
“forklifts utilization”, “order assembling mean waiting time”, and “free main storage space”. In level one,
forklifts utilization is applied to analyze the impact of the failure. In level two, forklifts utilization plus
order assembling mean waiting time is applied. In level three, all three KPIs are applied together. More
importantly, in each level there are two different scenarios as comparison analysis. Scenario one is 20
forklifts, scenario two is 30 forklifts. All KPI combinations are used in each scenario separately to
identify which condition may enhance the distribution center’s performance. The whole process of
analysis in this session is to create a conceptual algorithm to show how discrete event simulation can
enhance FMEA.

Level 1- One KPI
In level one, the “forklifts utilization” is applied as KPI. “forklifts utilization” is the result of
forklifts being used at the moment divided by the forklifts amount. The KPI is applied for two different
scenarios, which are 20 forklifts in the center, and 30 forklifts in the center. An assumption is made in
level 1 to better utilize the simulation outcome. It is assumed that “forklifts utilization expected” to be
90% at most in order to keep the remaining 10% for emergency. With that figure 5 shows the “forklifts
utilization” result when there are 20 forklifts in the center, and it is 100%. That means all the forklifts are
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being used, but no forklifts left for emergency. So, it can be concluded that when there are 20 forklifts in
the center, all of them are operating without being idle. But, there is not ant forklifts for emergency use.
So, the RPN from the Analysis A can be modified. The severity is modified from 8 to 7. The occurrence
remains the same as 5. The detection is changed from 6 to 3 because of the fact that discrete event
simulation’s outcome can help better detect the failures. Hence, the new severity is 7, occurrence is 5,
detection is 3, and RPN is 105. This analysis is called “Analysis B”.
Figure 5: Forklifts utilization- Analysis B (20 forklifts)

To make a comparison analysis and better understand the system performance, the scenario of 30
forklifts in the center is analyzed. The same assumption is applied in this scenario. The figure 6 shows the
outcome when there are 30 forklifts in the center. The “forklifts utilization” is still 100% without having
forklifts for emergency. It can be concluded that when there are 30 forklifts in the center, all of them are
being utilized with no extra forklifts for future emergencies. Therefore, the 30 forklifts are not enough
when other variables are static. Since the outcome is very similar to Analysis B, the RPN and other
elements remain the same. They are, severity 7, occurrence 5, detection 3, and RPN 105. This analysis is
called “Analysis B`”. The first phase conceptual algorithm is shown in table 7.
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Figure 6: Forklifts utilization- Analysis B` (30 forklifts)

Table 7: 1st Phase of Step by Step Analysis Development to Improve FMEA Via Simulation
(Illustration Using Forklift Amount in Warehouse Operation)
FMEA
Discrete Event Simulation
Analysis A (20 forklifts):
Analysis B (20 forklifts, 1 KPI):
• Severity: 8
• Severity: 7
• Occurrence: 5
• Occurrence: 5
• Detection: 6
• Detection: 3
• RPN: 240
• RPN: 105
Analysis A` (30 forklifts):
• Severity: ?
• Occurrence: ?
• Detection: ?
• RPN: ?

Analysis B` (30 forklifts, 1 KPI):
§ Severity: 7
§ Occurrence: 5
§ Detection: 3
§ RPN: 105

Level 2- Two KPIs
In level 2, two KPIs are used. They are “forklifts utilization” and “Order Assembling Mean
Waiting Time”. Order assembling mean waiting time is the between when an order is placed and when the
order is completely assembled, and forklifts’ efficiency has a strong impact on it. Assumption for this
criterion is that order assembling waiting time cannot be greater than 5 minutes. With that, figure 7 shows
the forklifts utilization and assembling waiting time when there are 20 forklifts in the center. The result
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shows that the assembling mean waiting time is more than 10 minutes and it is twice greater than
expected waiting time. Now, it can be concluded that although all the forklifts are being utilized, order
assembling mean waiting time is still twice greater than expectation. The RPN can be modified based on
this conclusion. The severity is 9, occurrence is 5, detection is 3, and RPN is 135. This analysis is called
“Analysis C”.
Figure 7: Analysis C- forklifts utilization & order assembling mean waiting time (20 forklifts)

Same KPIs are applied for new analysis- “Analysis C`”- as comparison to Analysis C. There are
30 forklifts in the center in new analysis. The expectation for order assembling mean waiting time is still
the same, which is 5 minutes. The figure 8 is the result for forklifts utilization and order assembling mean
waiting time when there are 30 forklifts in the center. The data shows that the waiting time is between 3.3
minutes to 4.2 minutes and that is within the expectation. The performance regarding the assembly time is
improved significantly. The conclusion can be although all the forklifts are being utilized without leaving
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10% for emergency, the order assembly waiting time meets requirement and is improved. Therefore, the
RPN can be modified. The new severity is 6, occurrence is 5, detection is 3, and
RPN in 90. The table 8 is the second phase of conceptual algorithm.
Figure 8: Analysis C`- forklifts utilization & order assembling mean waiting time (30 forklifts)

Table 8: 2nd Phase of Step by Step Analysis Development to Improve FMEA Via Simulation
(Illustration Using Forklift Amount in Warehouse Operation)
FMEA Analysis
Discrete Event Simulation
Analysis A (20 forklifts):
Analysis B (20 forklifts, 1 KPI): Analysis C (20 forklifts, 2
KPIs):
• Severity: 8
• Severity: 7
§ Severity: 9
• Occurrence: 5
• Occurrence: 5 •
§ Occurrence: 5
• Detection: 3
Detection: 6
§ Detection: 3
• RPN: 105
RPN: 240
§ RPN: 135
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Analysis A` (30 forklifts):
• Severity: ?
• Occurrence: ?
• Detection: ?
• RPN: ?

Analysis B` (30 forklifts, 1
KPI):
§ Severity: 7
§ Occurrence: 5
§ Detection: 3
§ RPN: 105

Analysis C` (30 forklifts, 2
KPIs):
§ Severity: 6
§ Occurrence: 5
§ Detection: 3
§ RPN: 90

Level 3- Three KPIs
In level 3, there are three KPIs. The newly added KPI is “free main storage space”. The reason
this KPI is chosen is because main storage space can have an impact on forklifts efficiency. Similarly, the
combination of three KPIs are applied in two different scenarios separately. The assumption for the “free
main storage space” is that there should be at least 80% of free space for forklifts to transport efficiently.
With that, the figure 9 illustrates the result when there are 20 forklifts in the center. The new information
is that there are 88% of free space when there are 20 forklifts in the center. Therefore, it can be inferred
that although order assembling mean waiting time does not meet the requirement when forklifts utilization
is 100%, the distribution center has enough space for forklifts’ transportation. The previous RPN can be
modified. The new severity is 8, occurrence is 5, detection is 3, and RPN is 120. This analysis is called
“Analysis D”.
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Figure 9: Analysis D- forklifts utilization & order assembling mean waiting time &
free main storage space (20 forklifts)

Analysis D`- when there are 30 forklifts in the center- is done as a comparison to Analysis D and
other analysis. Same KPIs and assumptions in Analysis D are applied in the new analysis. The figure 10
shows the result when there are 30 forklifts operating in the center. This time, the free space is 84%. It is
also within the expectation. Additionally, the order assembling mean waiting time and forklifts utilization
are same as previous scenarios when there were 30 forklifts in the center. Hence, it can be concluded that
although all the forklifts are being utilized, order assembling mean waiting time, and free main storage
space are within the expectation. The RPN can be modified based on new outcome. The new severity is 5,
occurrence is 5, detection is 3, and RPN is 75. The final phase of conceptual algorithm is given in table 6.
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Figure 10: Analysis D`- forklifts utilization & order assembling mean waiting time &
free main storage space (30 forklifts)

Table 9: 3rd Phase of Step by Step Analysis Development to Improve FMEA Via Simulation
(Illustration using Forklift Amount in Warehouse Operation)
FMEA analysis
Discrete Event Simulation
Analysis A (20
forklifts):
• Severity: 8
• Occurrence: 5
• Detection: 6
• RPN: 240
Analysis A` (30
forklifts):
• Severity: ?
• Occurrence: ?
• Detection: ?
• RPN: ?

Analysis B (20
forklifts, 1 KPI):
• Severity: 7
• Occurrence: 5
• Detection: 3
• RPN: 105
Analysis B` (30
forklifts, 1 KPI):
§ Severity: 7
§ Occurrence: 5
§ Detection: 3
§ RPN: 105

Analysis C (20
forklifts, 2 KPIs):
§
Severity: 9
§
Occurrence: 5 §
Detection: 3
§
RPN: 135

Analysis D (20
forklifts, 3 KPIs):
§
Severity: 9
§
Occurrence: 5 §
Detection: 3
§
RPN: 135

Analysis C` (30
forklifts, 2 KPIs):
§ Severity: 6
§ Occurrence: 5
§ Detection: 3
§ RPN: 90

Analysis D` (30
forklifts, 3 KPIs):
§ Severity: 6
§ Occurrence: 5
§ Detection: 3
§ RPN: 90

27

Summary on Discrete Event Simulation

After applying discrete event simulation to analyze the failure mode in distribution center, it can
be seen that simulation can provide evidentiary data and stronger cause-effect analysis capacity that
FMEA lacks. Another advantage discrete event simulation has is that it can visualize the whole operation
which is helpful to discover as many failure modes as possible.
More importantly, applying the step by step approach in the case study, discrete event simulation
is even more helpful to understand the dynamic of the system using RPN score. The table 6 shows the
step by step analysis from “Analysis A” to “Analysis D`”. Through RPN scores in the table, performance
of the distribution center is better learned using different environment and different KPIs. The whole
process offers more thorough and deeper analysis. Also, based on the change and stabilization of the RPN
score, it can be seen that FMEA’s analysis capability is enhanced. The chart 1 and 2 show the RPN’s
change and stabilization along with step by step analysis. In each chart, it can be seen that starting from
the DES (1 KPI) RPN scores change drastically and their range is within a linear trend. So, it indicates
along with better understanding of the system using discrete event simulation, the original FMEA’s result
is improved and stabilized. The point where RPN score changes drastically or starts being linear trend can
be considered as FMEA enhancement point. This could also be applied in different cases as well.
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Figure 11: RPN stabilized point using KPI (20 forklifts)
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Figure 12: RPN stabilized point using KPI (30 forklifts)
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CHAPTER VI: CONCLUSION

FMEA is a widely applied Six Sigma tool for process and product optimization. However, it has
some inherited drawbacks. In this research, after reviewing abundant literature regarding FMEA’s
enhancement, its remaining deficiencies are identified, which are subjective analysis and lack of
causeeffect analysis capability. Then, discrete event simulation is introduced as a tool to improve FMEA.
By using a case study, a step by step analysis approach using different KPIs and scenarios was
demonstrated in order to showcase how discrete event simulation can enhance FMEA.
After applying discrete event simulation, FMEA’s subjectivity and cause-effect analysis
capability is significantly improved. This is due to Discrete Event Simulation quantifies the FMEA’s
rating approach for Severity, Occurrence, and Detection of a failure mode. FMEA becomes more
accountable after relying on simulation result instead of subjective understanding. This can result in better
identifying the underlying risks in the system and identifying the solution for them. On the other hand, the
step by step analysis with different KPIs and in different scenarios provided a new insight to understand
the dynamics of the system. Table 10 shows the generalized step by step analysis approach. In the table,
using different combination of KPI(s) and different scenarios, each analysis can tell us different story
about the system. This can help better understand the failure modes and system performance under
different conditions. Such an approach can be applied on other failure modes using specific KPIs and
scenarios in various domains.
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FMEA analysis

Table 10: Generalized Step by Step Analysis Approach
Discrete Event Simulation

Analysis A (Scenario
A):
• Severity: a
• Occurrence: b
• Detection: c
• RPN: abc
Analysis A` (Scenario
B):
• Severity: x
• Occurrence: y
• Detection: z
• RPN: xyz

Analysis B (Scenario A,
1 KPI):
• Severity: a’
• Occurrence: b’
• Detection: c’
• RPN: abc’
Analysis B` (Scenario B,
1 KPI):
§ Severity: x’
§ Occurrence: y’
§ Detection: z’
§ RPN: xyz’

Analysis C (Scenario A,
2 KPIs):
§ Severity: a’’
§ Occurrence: b’’
§ Detection: c’’
§ RPN: abc’’
Analysis C` (Scenario B,
2 KPIs):
§ Severity: x’’
§ Occurrence: y’’
§ Detection: z’’
§ RPN: xyz’’

Analysis D (Scenario A, n
KPIs):
§ Severity: a’’’
§ Occurrence: b’’’
§ Detection: c’’’
§ RPN: abc’’’
Analysis D` (Scenario B,
n KPIs):
§ Severity: x’’’
§ Occurrence: y’’’
§ Detection: z’’’
§ RPN: xyz’’’

Furthermore, RPN scores fluctuates along with analysis as well. However, there will be a point
from which the original RPN score from FMEA changes drastically or starts to be stable in an
approximately linear trend. This point can be considered as a reference point for FMEA’s enhancement.
Chart 3 shows generalized RPN stabilized point. Through stabilized RPN score trend, cause-effect of
failures can be analyzed in depth, and more suitable corrective actions may be revealed from the analysis
process. Such a trend can also be an indication for either further analysis or moving onto next step in
which future corrective mitigations are discussed.
Figure 13: Generalized RPN stabilized Point
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R PN 4
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Finally, by applying discrete event simulation with FMEA, the whole analysis can be more qualitative
and objective. Discrete event simulation’s strong evidentiary data can also strengthen the cause-effect
capability of FMEA. More importantly, the generalized step by step approach using simulation, can
provide more prospective and insights to optimize the various real-life system behavior.
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CHAPTER VII: FUTURE STUDIES
The distribution center model in this research is a pre-existed model. Therefore, there is a
limitation to prove the effectiveness of the proposed method. To overcome that, researches on applying
the method on a real-life scenario can be done in order to validate the effectiveness of the step by step
analysis approach.

On the other hand, to create a discrete event simulation, well understanding of the processes and
components is needed. So, by providing more qualitative insights to design a simulation in the first place,
it may be possible for FMEA to improve discrete event simulation’s accuracy. With that, future
researches can be done to explore FMEA’s ability to enhance discrete event simulation’s outcome. This
may help simulation industry to improve their work efficiency and sustainability for the long term as well.
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APPENDIX (COMPLETE FMEA ANALYSIS)
Table 3: Complete FMEA analysis on distribution center

Category

Sub-category

Possible Failure

More than needed

Unloading
Docks

Number of
Docks

Less than needed

Cause of the failure

Effects of the failure

Occurance Severerity Detection

A:
May
Cause
unnecessary waste of
Insufficient
space
understanding of order B: May increase
flow
unnecessary
management cost.
A: May cause longer
unloading time, hence
may delay the orders.
Insufficient
B: May cause stress to
understanding of order employees due to
flow
pressure from
unloading process.
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Current Control RPN

Action Priorty

Suggested Action

4

5

2

Visual
inspection

40

Relatively High

Analyze the order flow,
and adjust the number
of docks based on it.

4

7

2

Visual
inspection

56

Relatively High

Analyze the order flow,
and adjust the number
of docks based on it.

Wrong decision on
space for docks

A:
May
cause
unnecessary waste of
space.
B: May increase
unnecessary
management cost.

2

5

2

Visual
inspection

20

Low

Analyze the order flow,
pallet flow, and adjust
the sapce of docks
based on it.

Less than needed

Wrong decision on
space for docks

A: There will not be
enough space for
palletRacks, hence
may cause longer
unloading time.
B: May cause stress to
employees.

3

6

3

Visual
inspection

54

Relatively High

Analyze the order flow,
pallet flow, and adjust
the sapce of docks
based on it.

More than needed

A: Causes
unnecessary waste of
Insufficient
space
understanding of order B: May increase
flow
unnecessary
management cost.

2

5

2

Visual
inspection

20

Low

Analyze the order flow,
and adjust the number
of docks based on it.

3

7

2

Visual
inspection

42

Relatively High

Analyze the order flow,
and adjust the number
of docks based on it.

4

5

2

Visual
inspection

40

Relatively High

Analyze the order flow
and adjust the sapce of
docks based on it.

4

7

2

Visual
inspection

56

Relatively High

Analyze the order flow
and adjust the sapce of
docks based on it.

More than needed

Space of
Docks

Number of
Docks

Less than needed

Loading
Docks

A: May cause longer
loading time, hence
may delay the orders.
Insufficient
B: May cause stress to
understanding of order employees due to
flow
pressure from loading
process.

More than needed

Wrong decision on
space for docks

Less than needed

Wrong decision on
space for docks

Space of
Docks

Category

Subcategory

Possible Failure

Cause of the failure

Decided by the
More than needed
manufacturer
Capacity of
Unloading
Trucks
Decided by the
Less than needed
manufacturer

Unloading
Trucks

Maintenance
The manufacturer
Damages during
of Unloading
fails to maintain
the delivery
regularly
Trucks

Amount of
Unloading
Trucks

Less than needed

Decided by the
manufacturer

A:
May
cause
unnecessary waste of
space.
B: May increase
unnecessary
management cost.
A: There will not be
enough space for
palletRacks, hence
may cause longer
loading time.
B: May cause stress
to employees. C: May
delay the orders.
D:
May
cause
overreliance
on
standby storage.

Effects of the
Occurance Severerity Detection Current
failure
Control
A: May cause
overinventory B:
May
increase
Manufacturer's
3
6
3
management cost
responsibility
due
to
overinventory
A: May decrease
the work
Manufacturer's
efficiency. B:
3
7
3
responsibility
May delay the
orders.
A: May cause
safety problem
during
the
Manufacturer's
delivery
2
7
2
responsibility
B: May cause
longer delivery time,
hence may delay
the orders

May delay the
orders.

4

38

7

4

RPN Action Priorty

54

Relatively
High

Suggested Action
Based on the order
flow,
give
manufacturer
feedback to adjust
truck capacity.

63

High

Based on the order
flow,
give
manufacturer
feedback to adjust
truck capacity.

28

Low

Give feedback to
the manufacturer

Manufacturer's
112
responsibility

Urgent

Based on the order
flow,
give
manufacturer
feedback to adjust
the
amount
of
trucks
they
possess.

Capacity of
Loading
Trucks

Insufficient
More than needed understanding of
order flow

May decrease
the efficiency
of
every
deliviry.

Insufficient
Less than needed understanding of
order flow

A: May delay the
orders.
B: May increase
unnecessary truck
utilization
C: May cause extra
purchase of trucks

Insufficient
understanding of
More than needed
order flow
Loading
Trucks

Amount of
Loading
Trucks

Insufficient
Less than needed understanding of
order flow

Maintenance
Damages during Fail to maintain
of Loading
the delivery
regularly
Trucks

Category

Sub-category

Possible Failure

More than needed

Main Storage
Area

Less than needed
Spaces

More than needed
Standby
Storage

Less than needed

3

3

May ncrease labor
cost, maintenance
cost, and purchase
fee of trucks.
A: May delay the
orders.
B: May increase
unnecessary truck
utilization
C: May cause extra
purchase of trucks
A: May cause
safety problem
during
the
delivery
B: May cause
longer delivery
time, hence may
delay the orders C:
May shorten the
trucks' lifetime

6

7

2

2

N/A

N/A

2

5

2

Daily
inspection

3

7

2

Daily
inspection

3

7

3

Regular
maintenance

Cause of the failure Effects of the failure Occurance Severerity Detection Current
Control
A:
May
cause
unnecessary waste
of
Insufficient
space
understanding of
Visual
B: May cause
the order flow,
2
6
2
inspection
unnecessary
and need for
management
inventory.
cost C: May
cause
overinventory
A: May cause low
Insufficient
inventory, hence
understanding of
may delay the
Visual
the order flow,
orders. B: May
3
7
3
inspection
and need for
cause extra
inventory.
delivery fee (from
manufacturer)
A:
Insufficient
A:
May
cause
understanding of
unnecessary waste
the order flow
of
B: Insufficient space space
Visual
2
5
2
for
B:
May
inspection
Main Storage
increase
unnecessary
management
cost
A:
Insufficient
understanding of
A: May cause
the order flow
longer
loading
Visual
4
6
2
B: More space for time, hence may
inspection
Main Storage than delay the orders.
needed.

39

36

Relatively
High

Based on the
order
flow,
adjust
truck
capacity.

42

Relatively
High

Based on the
order flow, adjust
truck capacity or
purchase
new
trucks.

20

42

63

Low

Relatively
High

High

RPN Action Priorty

Based on the
order flow, adjust
amount of trucks.

Based on the
order flow, adjust
amount of trucks.

Follow the regular
maintenance.
Also, implement
monitering
solution.

Suggested Action

24

Low

Analyze the order
flow and adjust the
space based on it.

63

High

Analyze the order
flow and adjust the
space based on it.

Low

Analyze the order
flow, and current
main storage. Then
adjust the space
based on it.

20

48

Relatively
High

Analyze the order
flow, and current
main storage. Then
adjust the space
based on it.

Insufficient
understanding
of
More than needed forklift
transportation, and
utilization.
Space for
Forklift
Transportation
Insufficient
understanding
of
Less than needed forklift
transportation, and
utilization.

Category

Subcategory

Possible
Failure

More than
needed

All
Capacity of
PalletRacks PalletRacks

Less than
needed

A: May cause
unnecessary
waste of space.
B: May increase
unnecessary
management
cost. C: May
decrease
spaces
for
storage.
A: May cause
safety problem
during
the
operation.
B: May cause
longer operation
time, hence may
delay the orders.

Cause of the
failure

Effects of the
failure

A: Insufficient
understanding
of order flow
B: Insufficient
understanding
of need for
inventory

A: May cause
unnecessary
waste of space.
B:
May
increase
unnecessary
management
cost.

3

3

5

7

3

Visual
inspection

3

Visual
inspection

Occurance Severerity Detection Current
Control

2

A: Insufficient A: May cause
understanding low inventory,
of order
hence may
delay the
flow
B: Insufficient orders. B: May
understanding cause longer
of need for unloading and
loading time.
inventory

2

A: May cause
safety
Insufficient
problem
Employees understanding
during
the
in
Human
of all
Lack of training operation. B:
Resources Distribution
relative
May delay the
Center
operation
orders.
processes
C: May decrease
work efficiency.

4

40

5

7

8

3

3

3

45

Relatively
High

63

High

RPN

Visual
30
inspection

Visual
42
inspection

N/A

96

Analyze the daily
forklift
utilization.Then
adjust the space
based on it.

Analyze the daily
forklift
utilization.Then
adjust the space
based on it.

Action
Priorty

Suggested
Action

Low

Analyze the
order flow,
and need for
inventory.
Then adjust
the capacity
of
PalletRacks.

Analyze the
order flow,
and need for
Relatively inventory.
High
Then adjust
the capacity
of
PalletRacks.

Urgent

Arrange
regular
training for
employees
and
managers.
Also, issue
operation
handbook if
possible.

